This website uses essential cookies to ensure proper functionality. We do not use tracking cookies. We use cookieless analytics to understand how our site is used.

Op-ed

Why deterrence is not enough and the Russian unitary-imperial state must be dismantled

Iryna Sieidkhanova
Russia Delenda Est: why deterring Russia is not enough

We would like to share with you a very interesting text written by Cemil Kerimoglu, PhD in neuroscience, history lover and polyglot. He shares his thoughts on history, politics and modern western society on his Substack account:

In the aftermath of the First World War, the Russian Empire lay in ruins. Its collapse seemed imminent. What the Bolsheviks set out to accomplish was, in essence, the reconstitution of the Russian Empire – this time under a different ideological banner. Indeed, the term “Russian Civil War” is a misnomer, for it obscures a fundamental dimension of what was taking place: the resurgence of Russian imperialism under Bolshevik rule. The ideology had changed, but the underlying imperial expansionism remained remarkably intact. One after another, the Bolsheviks moved to suppress and reconquer the nations and republics that had declared their independence or asserted their autonomy.

The Bolsheviks also turned their attention westward, towards Ukraine and Poland. Ukraine, in particular, was indispensable to the preservation of Russia as an empire. Without Ukraine, the entire imperial edifice risked coming apart. But the Bolsheviks encountered formidable resistance. Poland and Ukraine forged an alliance, spearheaded by Józef Piłsudski and Symon Petliura, to confront the advancing Russian forces. And in August 1920, as the Red Army advanced on Warsaw, the Soviet offensive was decisively repelled in the historic Battle of Warsaw – the Miracle on the Vistula.

Poland had defended its independence and Ukraine’s long-cherished dream of sovereignty seemed within reach. The defeat of the Russian offensive had opened up a historic possibility: an independent Ukraine could have dealt a devastating blow to the Bolshevik attempt of resurrecting the Russian Empire. Everything seemed to be moving in the right direction. A happy ending was near.

But then something went wrong. Poland and Ukraine had been struggling to finance their war effort. Their resources were limited, and sustaining the fight required material support from abroad. Polish and Ukrainian diaspora communities across Western Europe had rallied to their cause. Donations poured in from ordinary people, while sympathetic sections of European society mobilized to support the joint Polish-Ukrainian struggle for independence. There was a growing sense of solidarity with the nations fighting to preserve their freedom against Russian imperial expansion.

And yet, just as the struggle was turning decisively in Poland’s and Ukraine’s favor, Russian propaganda began to take its toll. The Bolsheviks had found a powerful means of influencing Western European societies. They portrayed their expansionist military offensives as a heroic struggle to liberate workers and peasants from their supposed oppressors – the wicked Polish pans. According to this narrative, the Russians were not invaders but liberators. Whereas the Poles and Ukrainians resisting Russian domination and fighting for their national independence were presented as defending a reactionary social order against the emancipation of the working class.

And astonishingly, this narrative found a receptive audience within the Western European labor movement. The aggressors had succeeded in presenting themselves as liberators, while those resisting aggression were recast as oppressors. Does any of this sound familiar?

The consequences of Russian propaganda had direct implications for the war. The Polish and Ukrainian war effort depended heavily on the delivery of weapons and military supplies from abroad. But those deliveries had to pass through European ports and railway networks. And the people who operated those networks – the dockworkers and railway workers – could determine whether the desperately needed supplies reached their destinations.

Influenced by Bolshevik propaganda, the labor movement in Western Europe began boycotting the transport of arms intended for Poland and Ukraine. Workers refused to handle military shipments, disrupting and delaying the delivery of weapons to the very nations struggling to defend themselves against Russian reconquest.

Ordinary Europeans who believed themselves to be standing up for the oppressed were, in effect, obstructing the struggle of nations fighting to escape imperial subjugation. Convinced that they were serving the cause of liberation, they were helping to undermine it. And therein lay the tragedy. At a critical moment, when Poland and Ukraine desperately needed continued support, Russian propaganda had succeeded in turning parts of Western European society against their cause.

But there was another factor at play – one that would prove equally consequential. Within Poland itself, Piłsudski’s vision of a free and sovereign Ukraine as one of the cornerstones of a broader Central and Eastern European alliance was coming under increasing pressure. The National Democracy movement, led by Roman Dmowski, rejected his vision. Driven by petty nationalism and territorial claims to cities such as Lviv, and willing to seek an accommodation with Russia if it served what they perceived to be Poland’s national interests, Dmowski and his followers fiercely opposed Piłsudski’s plans. They preferred the pursuit of immediate territorial gains to the construction of a lasting alliance with an independent Ukraine.

And ultimately, their vision prevailed. Poland abandoned its Ukrainian ally. In March 1921, it signed the Treaty of Riga with Russia, securing (temporary) peace and territorial concessions for itself while leaving Ukraine to face the Red Army alone. Ukraine was eventually incorporated into the Soviet Union and its independence was crushed. What followed were decades of brutal repression under Soviet rule: forced collectivization, the suppression of Ukrainian national identity and culture, mass executions, and the man-made famine of the Holodomor.

Poland, meanwhile, believed it had secured its own future by reaching an accommodation with Russia at Ukraine’s expense. But it would soon discover just how illusory that security was. And it would learn the lesson in the most devastating way imaginable. Less than two decades later, in September 1939, Poland itself was invaded by the Soviet Union, this time in concert with Nazi Germany.

Infographic by SEE Ukraine
Infographic by SEE Ukraine

The very imperial power with which Poland had sought an accommodation at the expense of its Ukrainian ally had returned to destroy Polish independence. In pursuing narrow, short-term “national interests” at the expense of a lasting strategic alliance, Poland had helped undermine the very arrangement that might have offered it greater security in the long run.

And thus, at a moment when the Bolshevik attempt to resurrect the Russian Empire might still have been thwarted, Russia was given the opportunity to recover. Through their success in manipulating European public opinion, undermining European support for their victims, and exploiting divisions among the nations resisting their expansion, Russians managed to reassemble much of the old empire.

What had seemed a genuine possibility – the collapse of Russia’s imperial structure and the emergence of new independent nations in Eastern Europe and northern Eurasia – was allowed to slip away. Russia managed to reconstitute its empire, because its victims and their potential allies had failed to recognize the magnitude of the historic opportunity before them.

History is repeating, it seems. Russia is losing its war against Ukraine. Against overwhelming odds, Ukrainians have, through their courage, determination, and extraordinary ingenuity – and with crucial support from the West – managed to turn the tide of the war. The momentum has increasingly shifted in Ukraine’s favour. Ukrainian drones are now striking targets deep inside Russia on an almost daily basis, with the scale and intensity of these attacks steadily increasing. Oil refineries, in particular, have become prime targets, threatening one of the foundations of Russia’s economy. Ukraine has also developed and deployed its own cruise missiles and is making progress towards producing domestically developed ballistic missiles.

For a time, everything seemed to be moving in the right direction. Ukrainian victory, once dismissed by so many as an impossibility, was beginning to appear within reach. But it is precisely at such moments that Russia has historically proved adept at manipulating its adversaries to its advantage.

Just as it did a century ago, Russia is once again attempting to compensate for its military shortcomings by manipulating Western societies. Rather than achieving victory through military prowess, it seeks to avert defeat by turning Ukraine’s own allies against its war effort. The objective is to persuade Western governments and populations to curtail, obstruct, or withhold the very support that Ukraine needs to press home its advantage.

Across Europe and the United States, voices sympathetic to Russia have gone into overdrive. Rather than reconsidering their earlier predictions and acknowledging Ukraine’s resilience, they have doubled down on their pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian positions. Indeed, as Ukraine has demonstrated an increasing capacity to resist and strike back, their rhetoric has grown ever more strident and hostile.

Consider how their arguments have evolved. Initially, the prevailing refrain was that Ukraine was simply too weak to withstand Russia. Its defeat was supposedly inevitable, and therefore any Western assistance was futile – a pointless waste of resources that would merely delay the inevitable.

Another recurring argument was that Ukraine must not be allowed to strike targets inside Russia with Western-supplied weapons. Such attacks, we were told, would constitute a dangerous escalation, effectively drawing the West into a direct confrontation with Russia. The implication was that Western countries would become parties to the conflict merely by enabling Ukraine to strike the territory of its aggressor.

Yet, curiously enough, the same concern about escalation seemed to evaporate whenever Russia received assistance from its own foreign partners. Russia could acquire Iranian Shahed drones to bombard Ukrainian cities. It could receive ballistic missiles from North Korea. It could even deploy North Korean soldiers to bolster its invasion. None of this, apparently, was considered sufficiently objectionable to warrant the same alarm.

Infographic by SEE Ukraine
Infographic by SEE Ukraine

The double standard was glaring. Russia was apparently entitled to enlist foreign powers in its war of aggression, but Ukraine was to be denied comparable assistance in defending itself. When Russia received foreign weapons and soldiers, it was simply conducting its war. But when Ukraine received Western weapons with which to strike back, this was suddenly construed as provoking escalation and endangering world peace. The aggressor was allowed to internationalize its invasion, while the victim was expected to defend itself with one hand tied behind its back.

But then something happened that these critics had apparently not anticipated. Ukraine found a way around the restrictions. Drawing on its own technological ingenuity, it developed an increasingly sophisticated domestic drone industry and began striking targets deep inside Russian territory with weapons of its own production. Oil refineries, oil pumping stations, military installations, and other infrastructure supporting Russia’s war effort became the targets of Ukrainian long-range attacks.

Meanwhile, Russia continued its relentless bombardment of Ukraine’s residential neighborhoods, schools, hospitals, children’s playgrounds, kindergartens, and critical civilian energy infrastructure. Ukrainian civilians remained exposed to the daily terror of Russian missiles and drones.

And yet, as Ukraine demonstrated its ability to strike back, the narrative shifted. Ukraine had long been portrayed as a mere Western proxy, supposedly incapable of independent action. Now, after developing its own long-range drones and striking refineries and military infrastructure in Russia, it was suddenly being told to stop acting independently.

For instance, in Germany, the leader of the AfD Alice Weidel called for an end to Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian territory, arguing that striking a nuclear power was reckless. But consider the logic: Russia may invade Ukraine, bombard its cities and destroy its infrastructure, commit horrific atrocities, while Ukraine is expected to refrain from striking facilities that sustain the invasion – because its aggressor possesses nuclear weapons.

Earlier, the objection had been to strikes with Western-supplied weapons, supposedly because they risked drawing NATO into the war. Ukraine then developed weapons of its own, removing that justification. Yet the demand for restraint persisted. The goalposts had moved, but the practical consequence was unchanged: Ukraine’s capacity to resist was to be curtailed.

Whatever means Ukraine found to defend itself, another reason emerged why it should not use them. Russia was to be spared the consequences of its own aggression, even if that meant denying Ukraine the means to defend itself.

And then there was Donald Trump. If Russia could not defeat Ukraine on the battlefield, perhaps it could achieve through Washington what it had failed to accomplish through military force. In Trump, Moscow found a remarkably useful source of pressure on the Ukrainian war effort.

Consider what Ukraine has been asking of the United States. One of its most urgent needs is air defence – i.e., not offensive weapons, but systems capable of protecting its cities and civilian population from Russia’s ballistic missile attacks. And Ukraine is not even demanding that these systems be provided free of charge. It is willing to purchase them. Better still, Ukraine has long sought permission to manufacture missiles for Patriot air-defence systems under licence, thereby reducing its dependence on foreign supplies.

Yet Trump administration has consistently refused to provide these capabilities to Ukraine. Moreover, throughout his second presidency, Trump has repeatedly used America’s leverage over Ukraine to pressure it into accepting concessions to Russia. In March 2025, his administration suspended military assistance that had already been approved and interrupted intelligence sharing with Ukraine. The message was that even assistance essential to Ukraine’s defence could be withheld as a means of political pressure.

And this was not even a question of money. Intelligence sharing did not require the United States to provide Ukraine with additional weapons or transfer billions of dollars in new funding. Yet even this vital form of assistance was turned into an instrument of coercion.

Meanwhile, Trump’s approach towards Russia was strikingly different. Instead of consistently increasing the economic pressure on Moscow, his administration repeatedly resisted stronger sanctions and, in October 2026, waived the implementation of sweeping new sanctions authorized by Congress. At a time when Russia’s ability to finance its war ought to have been constrained as severely as possible, the United States was instead opening avenues for economic relief. The moral depravity was blatant. The victim was pressured to make concessions, while the brutal aggressor was offered opportunities to escape the consequences of its aggression.

And then came another familiar propaganda offensive. Ukraine, we were told, needed elections. Zelensky had supposedly lost his legitimacy. He was denounced as a dictator, and his removal was increasingly presented as a prerequisite for peace. As though it were Zelensky personally who had been resisting Russia all this time! As though the Ukrainian nation had no will of its own!

This narrative rests on a fundamental refusal to recognize Ukrainian agency. Its proponents appear unwilling – or perhaps simply unable – to comprehend that Ukraine is not fighting because Zelensky has ordered it to fight. Ukraine is fighting because its people refuse to submit to Russian domination. Ukraine is standing not because of Zelensky, but because of the willpower, determination, and agency of the Ukrainian nation itself.

But then came one of the most outrageous episodes. Trump pressed Ukraine to halt attacks on Russian oil refineries, which were disrupting an important part of Russia’s war economy. The stated concern was rising diesel prices.

Consider the asymmetry. Russia continued bombarding Ukrainian cities and energy infrastructure, yet Trump’s demand for restraint was directed at Ukraine. No comparable concession was demanded from Russia. Zelensky proposed a reciprocal arrangement: Ukraine would cease striking Russian refineries if Russia stopped attacking Ukrainian energy facilities. But this proposal was rejected by Trump.

Even assuming Ukraine’s strikes affected fuel prices, why should that economic concern outweigh Ukraine’s right to impede the machinery sustaining Russia’s invasion? The proposed “remedy” essentially constrained Ukraine rather than Russia. The practical effect would have been to shield Russian refining capacity from attack just as Ukraine had developed its own long-range capabilities.

But the pressure did not end there. Elon Musk, whose SpaceX satellite communications systems have become indispensable to Ukrainian military operations, also entered the picture. In October 2026, Ukrainian forces experienced severe restrictions on the satellite communications services they relied upon for drone operations. The disruption hampered their ability to conduct reconnaissance and intercept Russian drones. Subsequent reporting indicated that Musk had ordered restrictions on the service.

Moreover, Starlink is not simply a charitable service that Musk had magnanimously bestowed upon the Ukrainians. Poland is paying substantial sums to provide Starlink connectivity to Ukraine. It is a paid service, supported by a European ally to help a nation defend itself against invasion. Yet access to such a critical capability could apparently be curtailed at whim.

The broader implications were alarming. Ukraine could develop its own weapons, devise its own military strategy, and discover innovative means of countering Russian aggression. But if essential technological infrastructure remained under the control of pro-Russian figures, Ukraine’s war effort could still be undermined from outside.

And here we arrive at the central point. Unable to impose its will on Ukraine through military force, Russia stands to benefit enormously from pro-Russian actors within the West who can obstruct Ukraine’s war effort.

A century ago, Russian propaganda persuaded European workers to obstruct arms shipments to Poland and Ukraine. Today, similar constraints can arise from political pressure, restrictions on military assistance and narratives that cast Ukrainian self-defence as the obstacle to peace. Just like a century ago, Western decisions can weaken Ukraine at the very moment Russia is most vulnerable.

Moreover, that pattern is not confined to one side of the political spectrum. Russia can also exploit anti-war and anti-imperialist rhetoric on the Left. Groups such as the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) oppose Western arms deliveries to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia, presenting these positions as principles of peace.

This gives Russian propaganda a familiar opening. In 1920, the Bolsheviks portrayed their offensives as the liberation of peasants from the “Polish pans”; today Moscow claims to be liberating Ukrainians from “Nazis”. In both cases, imperial conquest is wrapped in the moral language of emancipation. The aggressor claims to be rescuing the very people it seeks to subjugate.

After all, Russia has never been particularly concerned with which ideological camp it supports, provided that doing so advances its interests. Indeed, one of the most striking characteristics of Russian propaganda is its schizophrenic nature. Russians have no difficulty promoting mutually contradictory narratives simultaneously, nor do they appear troubled by the glaring inconsistencies between them. And this approach is remarkably effective. Russians can promote diametrically opposed ideological positions, abandon one narrative in favour of another, or promote several incompatible narratives at once without the slightest mental discomfort. They will exploit any ideology, cultivate any political movement, and amplify any narrative that serves their purposes.

Consider the sheer absurdity of Russia’s self-presentation. To one audience, it portrays itself as the last remaining bastion of European traditionalism, the defender of Christian civilization, even the supposed saviour of the white race against decadence and multiculturalism. Yet, to another audience, the same Russia presents itself as the champion of the Global South, the leader of a worldwide struggle against Western imperialism, colonialism, and white supremacy – all the while, Russia itself remains an imperial state, waging a war of colonial conquest against a neighbouring nation. Obvious contradictions, distinctions between diametrically opposed states of matter don’t register in the consciousness of Russians.

This helps explain why Russia has so often succeeded in cultivating an extraordinary degree of goodwill among Western audiences – goodwill that bears little resemblance to the reality of its conduct. Russia can brutally subjugate neighbouring peoples, suppress their national identities, and commit horrific atrocities against civilian populations, all while presenting itself as their benevolent liberator. It can commit the very crimes it professes to be fighting against, then accuse its victims of those same crimes. And importantly, make a sizeable portion of Western audiences believe in its asinine narratives.

Russia has also sought to exploit historical grievances between Poland and Ukraine. Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Poland has been among Ukraine’s most steadfast supporters. Its efforts to raise awareness of the Russian threat and mobilize Western assistance for Ukraine have been instrumental. Yet, just as Ukraine has demonstrated its growing ability to strike back at Russia and the prospect of a decisive Russian defeat has come into view, old historical resentments have begun to rear their ugly heads in Poland.

At this critical juncture, sections of Polish society have chosen to revive grievances dating back more than eighty years, allowing the painful memories of past Polish-Ukrainian conflicts to fuel renewed hostility towards Ukrainians. This is happening at precisely the moment when Poland and Ukraine should be strengthening their alliance to deliver a decisive blow to their common enemy. Rather than learning from the tragic consequences of their divisions a century ago, they risk repeating the same mistakes. The parallels with 1921 are uncanny.

Meanwhile, Russia continues to promote another familiar narrative: that Russia must not be allowed to suffer a decisive defeat, and that its eventual disintegration must be prevented at all costs. The message is that a defeated and fragmented Russia would supposedly pose an intolerable threat to international stability.

A revealing example is The Economist publishing a guest essay by Russian oligarch Andrey Melnichenko, in which he warns Western audiences about the supposedly catastrophic consequences of Russia’s disintegration. Once again, the very state responsible for destabilizing the world is presented as an indispensable guarantor of stability whose survival must be protected.

The lesson of 1921 must not be forgotten. Back then, Russians manipulated European societies, and Ukraine paid the price. A century later, Europe must not let Russian propaganda or its own political fragmentation obstruct the assistance Ukraine needs at this very crucial moment.

As long as Russia continues to exist in its present unitary-imperial form, Europe and the Western world will know no lasting peace. Even when Russia lacks the military capacity to attack its neighbours directly, it will continue to undermine Western societies through propaganda, political interference, intimidation, and the exploitation of internal divisions. It will remain a bitter enemy of the West and will try to harm it at every opportunity.

Nor should anyone imagine that merely replacing the current Russian regime with a supposedly liberal one would resolve this problem. We have already witnessed such an experiment.

Consider Russia under Boris Yeltsin. In the 1990s, Russia was embraced by the West no questions asked. It received enormous political goodwill, financial & material assistance, and diplomatic recognition. It was allowed to keep its nuclear weapons – even to strengthen its nuclear and military arsenal by the US forcing Ukraine to transfer its own nuclear and nuclear-capable weapons to Russia. Russia was even welcomed into the exclusive G7, which became the G8 in 1998, despite its limited economic weight.

And what was this supposedly liberal Russia, the darling of the West, doing in the meantime? It instigated a coup in Georgia in 1991 overthrowing its popular president Zviad Gamsakhurdia, invaded Moldova in 1992, and invaded Chechnya in 1994 waging a genocidal war. All of this occurred under the very Russian government that the West was celebrating as a historic liberal-democratic breakthrough.

And soon enough, even that brief liberal experiment was reversed. With Putin’s rise to power, Russia became increasingly authoritarian and openly expansionist. What Western leaders and policymakers had hoped would become a lasting liberal-democratic transformation proved to be little more than a fleeting interlude.

Russia used all this goodwill to eventually strengthen itself for its next stage of aggression against the West. Moreover, almost all “liberals” of that Yeltsin era became more than willing servants of the Putin regime. They all gladly came on board with Putin and his agenda.

And therein lies the fundamental problem that the West has repeatedly failed to recognize. The problem is not merely the regime governing Russia, but the persistence of Russia itself as a unitary-imperial state. Whether “liberal”, authoritarian, communist or nationalist, whatever shape Russia might take, it will always aim to harm the West and remain its hateful enemy.

The West must therefore abandon its complacency. Ukrainian victory must be regarded as the beginning, not the end, of confronting Russia. Even the restoration of Ukraine’s internationally recognized 1991 borders, essential though it is, cannot by itself guarantee lasting peace in Europe. As long as Russia’s unitary-imperial structure remains intact, the underlying threat will remain.

Much is being said these days about deterring Russia. But Russia must not merely be deterred. Its unitary-imperial structure must be dismantled altogether. Deterrence, by its very nature, is a defensive strategy. It assumes that the threat will continue to exist and seeks only to prevent it from materializing. But adopting a permanently defensive posture against an inherently expansionist power risks condemning oneself to eventual defeat in the long run.

The emphasis on deterrence is therefore fundamentally short-sighted. Its time horizon is usually five or ten years, perhaps a few decades at most. But our time horizon should extend far beyond that – to the next hundred, two hundred, five hundred, even a thousand years! We must think not merely in terms of immediate geopolitical circumstances, but in terms of historical epochs and of generations yet unborn.

Consider the following scenario. Let us assume that Europe finally recognizes the Russian threat in its entirety. Suppose that sufficient political will emerges among European governments, policymakers, and populations to rearm, strengthen military capabilities, and establish a credible deterrent against further Russian aggression. Russia would indeed be deterred, at least for the foreseeable future. It would remain unable, or unwilling, to attack Europe.

But such an outcome would offer little more than a temporary, makeshift solution. Because Russia itself would still exist, its imperial structure and ambitions fundamentally intact. And there are several problems with this.

First, Russia’s threat to Europe is by no means confined to its ability to launch military invasions. Even if military deterrence succeeds, Russia can continue to undermine European societies from within through propaganda, disinformation, political interference, and influence operations. It can exploit ideological divisions, manipulate public opinion, and cultivate political movements sympathetic to its interests. Indeed, as we have seen, Russia has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to weaken its adversaries without confronting them militarily. Thus, deterring Russian armies does not mean neutralizing the Russian threat.

But there is an even more fundamental problem. What happens when Europe’s political climate changes? Suppose Europe successfully rearms today, building a formidable military deterrent supported by broad political consensus. What guarantees that this consensus will survive fifty or a hundred years from now? What if future generations of Europeans become complacent? What if pacifist and anti-armament movements gain the upper hand, dismantling the military capabilities and political resolve upon which the deterrence of Russia depended? Who can possibly predict the political attitudes, priorities, and ideological convictions of European societies a century from now?

Russia, meanwhile, would still be there – inimical to Europe as before. And should European resolve weaken, it would once again seize the opportunity to attack. Thus, by contenting itself with deterrence today, Europe risks leaving future generations exposed to precisely the same threat – perhaps under far less favourable circumstances. What appears to be a successful security arrangement in the present could prove disastrous over a longer historical horizon.

Relying exclusively on military deterrence, diplomatic agreements, or peace treaties with Russia therefore amounts to treating the symptoms while leaving the underlying cause untouched. And that underlying cause is the continued existence of Russia as a unitary-imperial state.

Expansionist empires do not abandon their ambitions merely because they suffer military setbacks. They may retreat, recover, adapt, and wait for a more favourable opportunity. Those who mistake temporary calm enabled by deterrence for permanent security and peace risk discovering, generations later, that their adversary has outlasted them.

And therein lies the fundamental asymmetry. An expansionist state that preserves its imperial ambitions can afford to wait, while societies content with merely deterring it may eventually lose the political will to sustain their defences. By thinking only in terms of immediate security rather than long-term historical consequences, they risk surrendering the strategic initiative to their adversary.

The history of relations between Muscovy-Russia and Eastern Europe illustrates this pattern with remarkable consistency. Time and again, Russia suffered major defeats and appeared to have been contained. Yet Europeans stopped short of crushing it completely. Russia survived, recovered, and eventually resumed its expansion, extending its dominion over ever greater portions of Eastern Europe.

Consider Muscovy’s crushing defeat in the Livonian War of 1558–1583. At the time, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth did not pursue the complete destruction of Muscovite power. Muscovy survived, recovered, and ultimately returned stronger.

A similar opportunity arose during the Time of Troubles in the early seventeenth century, when Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian forces, advanced deep into Muscovy and even occupied Moscow. Yet Muscovy survived this existential crisis. The occupying forces were eventually expelled, and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth ultimately settled for territorial concessions and a negotiated truce. The assumption, once again, was that Muscovy had been sufficiently weakened and that peace could be secured without fundamentally eliminating the threat. But Muscovy eventually regained its strength. In the war of 1654–1667, it expanded westward at the expense of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, conquering Left-Bank Ukraine and Kyiv.

Thus, what appeared at particular moments to be decisive victories over Muscovy proved, over the longer historical horizon, to be temporary setbacks in the expansion of Russian power. Muscovy-Russia survived its defeats, regained its strength, and continued pushing westward. Its adversaries won battles and wars. But over the centuries, it was Russia that expanded.

Infographic by SEE Ukraine
Infographic by SEE Ukraine

The same pattern repeated itself in the aftermath of the First World War and again following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In both cases, Russia’s imperial structure had suffered an enormous shock and a fundamental transformation of the political order across northern Eurasia appeared possible. Yet rather than ensuring that Russia’s imperial structure irreversibly collapses, Western policies ultimately helped Russia to restore its power. In both cases, Russia’s imperial structure survived. And in both cases, Russia used the respite for renewed aggressions.

This is the historical lesson that Europe must finally learn. The ultimate objective of Western policy must not be merely the deterrence of Russia, or even Ukrainian victory – indispensable though the latter is. It must be the dismantling of Russia’s unitary-imperial structure.

Only such a transformation offers the prospect of lasting peace and prosperity in Eurasia. Anything short of that would be kicking the can down the road, passing the same problem on to our children, grandchildren, and further generations. Our time horizon must extend beyond the next five or ten years. We must think in centuries, even millennia!

Europe must therefore abandon its complacency. As long as Russia’s unitary structure remains intact, the historical problem remains unresolved. In the meantime, Western societies must remain vigilant against Russian propaganda, infiltration, political manipulation, and influence operations designed to weaken their resolve from within.

But vigilance and deterrence alone are not enough. The ultimate objective must be the dismantling of Russia as a unitary state – not merely its democratization, liberalization, or the replacement of one ruling elite with another.

Russia must be demilitarized, denuclearized, and disintegrated into dozens of post-Russian states, each with its own unique national and regional identity that disavows the “Russian” past. This, and only this, will bring lasting peace and prosperity to Eurasia.

Russia must be destroyed. Whatever it takes. Russia delenda est."